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A. 
STATUS OF THE CASE 
To assure highway safety and financial protection for the public, the United States government 
requires interstate cargo haulers to register and obtain a Department of Transportation authority 
number. Western Home Transport and its independent contractors share the common use of such 
a number held in Western' s name. For the last five years, under the precedent of Giltner vs. 
Idaho Department of Commerce 145 Idaho 415, 179 P 3d 1071, (2008) this Court has held that, 
regardless of all other evidence of independence of operation, a truck owner-operator becomes an 
employee per se, if another's DOT authority is used. 
By its appeal and Appellant's Opening Brief, Western urges this Court to reverse Giltner. 
In reply, the Idaho Department of Labor opposes this result with three arguments: 
1. The principle of stare decisis does not permit this Court to overturn Giltner as 
controlling precedent. 
2. There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial 
Commission's findings. 
3. The Department should be awarded its costs and fees. 
By this Reply Brief, Western Home reasserts that Giltner is wrongly decided and urges 
that the Department's arguments are not compelling. 
B. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
STARE DECISIS IS A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD 
In arguing that the legal principle of stare decisis did not allow this Court to revisit the 
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Giltner decision, the Department failed to consider the single most expansive case law dicta on 
the topic found within the Idaho Reports. In State v. Card, 121Idaho425, 825 P 2d 1081 (1992) 
the Idaho Supreme again considered the constitutionality of the abolution of the insanity defense 
in criminal cases in the face of a subsequent attack, after previously having ruled on the topic. In 
a specially concurring opinion, Justice McDevitt, over five pages oflegal history examined, 
defined, critiqued and applied the principle. Upon the state of our law, he concluded: 
"As stare decisis evolved in Idaho, it is clear that this rule does not 
mandate unyielding acquiescence to prior decisions. Stare decisis 
is not a confining phenomenon but rather a principle of law." 
Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 801, 473 P 2d 937, 943 (1970). The rule, 
to stand by decided cases, and to maintain former adjudications, 
contemplates more than blindly following some former adjudication, 
manifestly wrong. If it were to be applied strictly, no former decision 
would ever be overruled. Higer v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 45, 64, 170 P. 2d 
411, 423 (1946) Accordingly, we recognize that this rule, "though one 
tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible. 
Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely 
within the discretion of the court ... " Hertz v. Woodman, 
218 U.S. 205, 212, 30 S. Ct. 621, 622, 54 L.Ed. 1001 (1910). Indeed, 
"when the application of this principle will not result in justice, it is 
evident that the doctrine is not properly applicable." Smith v. State, 
93 Idaho 795, 801, 473 P.2d 937, 943 (1970). Sometimes a court must 
adhere to prior unsatisfactory rules to avoid the difficult and burdensome 
results occurring after a change after a long period of accommodation. 
Helveringv. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 63 S. Ct. 636, 87 L.Ed. 843 (1943); 
Davis v. Department of Labor 317 U.S. 249, 63 S. Ct. 225, 87 L. ED. 
246 (1942); Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 57 S. Ct. 60, 81 L. Ed. 46 
(1936) 
While we must adhere to our previous decisions, stare decisis does require 
us to reexamine our prior precedents to determine whether they are still 
valid. The court has stated: 
This Court in the proper performance of its judicial function is required 
to examine its prior precedents. When precedent is examined in the light 
of modem reality and it is evident that the reason for the precedent is not 
a destruction of stare decisis but rather a fulfillment of its proper function." 
Id at 121 Idaho 443-444 
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Notably, Justice McDevit, while retaining his own conviction that the law was 
unconstitutional, set aside his prior dissent, adopted the Court's majority view as proper precedent 
where there were no compelling and cogent reasons which necessitated a departure from prior 
rulings. He did so because "litigants need to be assured that the law will remain substantially 
the same day to day." Id at 444 
Far from being a lock-box which must remain unopened forever, as both this Court and 
Justice McDevitt have noted, prior opinions should be revisited and retested under modem 
conditions periodically. In fact, with all due respect to the common law tradition, reversal of 
precedent "is a question entirely within the discretion of the court." Hertz v. Woodman, supra 
II. 
THE GILTNER PRECEDENT IS MANIFESTLY WRONG, UNWISE, UNJUST AND RIPE 
FOR REVERSAL 
The Department of Labor, from pages 7 through 14 of its Reply Brief urges the 
proposition that the rule of stare decisis typically requires that controlling precedent be followed, 
whenever this Court has established well-reasoned, worthy and just rules oflaw. The Appellant 
is comfortable with this test, even though it is ultimately subjective as noted above. However, 
this Court has also established parameters by which it may measure holdings which were ill-
conceived or subsequently have fallen afoul of societal change or sharper recent perspective. The 
typical framework for overruling an earlier holding in Idaho is: 
1. Is the decision manifestly wrong? 
2. Has the holding, over time, proven unjust or unwise? 
3. Will reversal vindicate plain, obvious principles oflaw and remedy a 
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continued injustice? State v. Humphries, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P 3d 652(2000) 
This Court is not, and should not be, hesitant to reverse itself when a holding has proven 
flawed, as measured by any or all of these tests. 
The holding of the majority in Giltner, especially with the contrarian perspective which 
was instantly supplied by a detailed dissent, is relatively easily found to be of the "suspect" 
category. 
As noted in Westem's Opening Brief, the rule that the use of another's DOT authority 
compels a finding of employment was simply pronounced in Giltner with no citation of prior 
Idaho case holdings, no adopted out-of-state case law and not even an explanation of a line of 
reasonmg. See Giltner 145 Idaho at 420, where the Court simply says: 
"Here, the reclassified drivers were not "engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession, or business." All of the 
reclassified drivers operated under Giltner's DOT authority. They had 
no authority to operate without this; they were solely dependent on 
Giltner's DIT authority to haul goods in interstate commerce. Therefore, 
as a matter oflaw, they could not be engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession or business. They were 
necessarily Giltner' s employees for purposes of Idaho's Employment 
Security Law. Thus we affirm the decision of the Commission." 
Of course, this lack of antecedents or logical development does not necessarily invalidate 
an adopted position, if the position is right, just and wise. However, the "DOT authority equals 
employment per se" rule is none of those. It fails on at least two significant grounds: 
A. THE PER SE RULE IS INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
LONGSTANDING IDAHO HOLDING THAT REQUIREMENTS COMPELLED BY 
GOVERNMENT REGULA TIO NS CAN NOT BE USED TO DETERMINE COVERED 
EMPLOYMENT 
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As long ago as 1961, this Court advised the Department of Employment that a finding of 
an employer-employee relationship could not be achieved or invented by citing features or facts 
by which the superior required the agent to comply with state or federal legal requirements. 
National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Employment Security Agency ofldaho, 83 Idaho 247, 360 P 2d 
994 (1961) 
This holding was reaffirmed in Giltner: 
'Therefore, the Commission erred in finding that Giltner's adherence 
to federal rules and regulations was evidence of control over the 
reclassified drivers. Such evidence cannot be used when analyzing 
the control prong of Idaho Code Section 72-1316. Furthermore, there 
was insufficient evidence otherwise demonstrating control." Id at 420, 
(from the paragraph of the opinion immediately preceding the other 
Giltner quoted above announcing the per se rule) 
Yet Giltner ignores the fact that sharing a DOT authority is just another form of 
regulatory compliance. 
Western requires in its independent contractor agreement that a driver should maintain a 
compliant logbook, take required physicals, meet insurance requirements and comply with all 
other Federal mandates. The DOT authority rule emanates from the same source and results in 
the same collaboration. The interstate highway truck is required to have the long haul 
registration and Western provides it. Driver reports and tax computations are governmentally 
required from the road and Western receives them and passes them through. However, these 
regulatory tentacles do not give Western any more unique control over the independent trucker. 
The controls arise from regulator demands. Having Western as an umbrella licensee and clearing 
house does not change the duty or day work of the trucker as to either the motoring public or 
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government agents. The joint use of DOT authority is logical, convenient for both the private 
and public sectors and nothing more or less than compliance with governmental regulation. The 
Court in Giltner is inconsistent when it charges the Department not to use such regulatory 
impacts in finding employment, but then does so itself by adopting the per-se rule. 
B. IT IS UNWISE, UNJUST AND MANIFESTLY WRONG TO DESTROY THE 
SHARED USE OF A DOT AUTHORITY FOR INDEPENDENT TRUCKERS 
This Appellant attempted to give the Department testimony to show a practical and 
accurate image of how the business life of an unsophisticated, but truly independent tractor-
owner could be facilitated by a shared system which alleviated compliance paperwork burdens 
and yet facilitated a continuation of open road freedoms for the small operator. Government 
regulation precludes any interstate hauling without anticipating, studying and responding to a 
multiplicity of jurisdictional rules. Is centralizing that compliance inherently wrong? If, as was 
shown to be the case with the Western self-employed truckers, the small operators were fully 
competent to file their own income tax forms as self employed and pay their own social security 
and labor-related fees, of what public purpose is it to call them "employees," simply because 
Western made certain that pre-trip permits were secured and post-trip road taxes were allocated? 
The Giltner rule sounds the deathknell of the independent trucker for no morally good or 
socially necessary reason, unwisely and unjustly. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ARE INSIGHTFUL AND SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS TO THE NON-GILTNER ISSUES AND 
ILLUSTRATE THE OVERREACHING OF THE DEPARTMENT TO FIND COVERED 
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EMPLOYMENT 
The Appellant is not unfriendly to the principal finding of fact and law made by the 
Industrial Commission: 
"(These) Drivers are Free from Control of Western Home Transport, Inc., Both 
under Contract of Service and in Fact." Decision and Order, p 4 R-26 
These findings are explained and recorded well in the Commission's Decision and Order. 
Of critical focus before this Court is the issue of compliance with government regulations. Yet, 
the Commission gave Western Home full credit for establishing regulatory oversight, without 
creating an employment relationship: 
"Western Home has an interest in ensuring that its drivers comply with 
all applicable federal regulations. Western Home also has an interest 
in ensuring that drivers made deliveries on time to specified customers. 
This kind of control would go to control over the results and, as the 
Idaho Supreme Court explained in Excell I, control over the results is 
not the same as control over the manner, method or mode by which a 
task is performed. 'Merely exerting control over the results of the 
work does not suggest an employment relationship." 141 Idaho 688, 
at 695, 116 P 3d 18, at 25 (2005) (citing Beale, 131 Idaho at 42, 951 P 2d 
at 1269). Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that adhering to 
federal law governing interstate trucking is not evidence to show an 
entity's control over a driver. Hernandez v. Triple Eli Transport, Inc., 
145 Idaho 37, 175 P. 3d 199 (2007). 
The provisions of the contract in this case go to enforcement of applicable 
state and federal regulations and ensure the outcome of the work for which 
the drivers are retained. The contract does not include provisions that 
would extend the control of Western Home over "the details of the work, 
the manner, method, or mode of doing it, the means by which it is to be 
accomplished, or, specifically, the details, manner, means, or method of 
doing the work, as contrasted with the result thereof." The routes over 
which a driver travels are dictated by permits issued by state authorities. 
The hours a driver works and sleeps are also mandated by federal statute. 
The costs for insurance and other expenses described in the contract do 
not control the manner, method, or mode of picking up the cargo and 
hauling it to the appointed destination, the work for which the owner/ 
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operators are retained. The weight of the evidence establishes that 
Western Home does not exert any control over the details, manner, or 
method the owner/operators use in performing their work beyond the 
terms described in the contract. Therefore, the owner/operators 
Western Home uses are free from the control of Western Home, both 
under the terms of the contract and in fact. Employer has satisfied the 
provisions ofldaho Code Section 72-1316(4)(a)." Decision and Order, 
p 6-7, R 27-28. 
The Commission next applied the statutory independence criteria of Idaho Code 
72-1316(4)(b), as augmented by the 15 point criteria ofIDAPA 09.01.35.112.04, to determine 
whether Western's contractors could be engaged in an "independently established trade." Two of 
the fifteen factors were given little weight, one deemed neutral, and one, driver's hours, said to 
be controlled by federal regulation. Of the remaining eleven criteria evaluated directly, the 
Commission concluded that seven of those illustrated an independent professional relationship. 
R-29-35 
This caused the Commission to concede that "there is significant evidence to suggest that 
the owner/operators in this case are independent contractors," even under the statutory terms and 
with the regulatory checklist. Decision and Order, p 14 R 35 However, this state of facts was 
rejected solely "as a matter oflaw for Western drivers", since "they operate under the Employer's 
DOT authority, the 'owner/operators are employees, not independent contractors, per Giltner". 
Id at R 35 
Thus, in effect, there is only one factual finding which is relevant here: A DOT authority 
was in common use by Western and its contractors on interstate trips. We concede that. 
Did that factor destroy the independence of operation of the drivers? Not according to the 
findings of the Commission. Did the Department carefully investigate this question of an 
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independent trade and accurately find facts upon which to deliberate objectively and base its own 
ruling? Absolutely not! 
As was shown in Appellant's Opening Brief, the Department's field investigator spoke to 
NO drivers, misunderstood key facts and reached at least 14 unsupported, speculative and 
incorrect conclusions in finding "employment" status, for thirteen drivers, eleven of whom had 
no contact with the Department in any form whatsoever. 
Thus, the Department's contention that the Commissions findings are factually supported 
is both wrong and right: 
1. The facts, found by the Commission properly deem these drivers independent. 
2. The Commission accurately found that Western Home's DOT authority was used by 
these drivers. 
3. The Commission DID NOT find a record which justified the finding of covered 
employment on any basis whatsoever, except this Court's mandate in Giltner. 
IV. 
THE DEPARTMENT'S EFFORTS TO DISTINGUISH PRIOR IDAHO CASE HOLDINGS 
ARE INSUFFICIENT: THIS COURT HAS FOUND A LACK OF EMPLOYMENT IN 
NEARLY IDENTICAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
At the top of page 13 of the Department's Brief, in a single paragraph, the Respondent 
offers arguments which seek to factually distinguish two relevant Idaho cases which Western 
urged were insightful as to both facts and law. 
Since the drivers in Hammond v. Department of Employment, 94 Idaho 66, 480 P 2d 912 
(1971) did not drive under another's DOT authority, it is discredited offers the Department. 
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Since National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Employment Security Agency ofldaho, 83 Idaho 247, 360 
P 2d 994 (1961) in which operators did use an umbrella DOT authority was decided before the 
common law standard was codified it must be ignored, suggests the Respondent. Both of such 
points miss the point. One is incorrect. 
It appears to the Appellant that Respondent is simply wrong when it says that "the drivers 
in Hammond did not drive under the putative employer's MC/DOT authority" Brief p 13 
The precise facts recited in the opinion of the Hammond Court are these: 
"Hammond has an Idaho PUC permit but no ICC permit. All shipments 
handled by Coulter and Frei are under the authority of Allied's ICC and 
Idaho PUC permits. Both drivers are subject to ICC rules and regulations 
regarding maximum driving hours, trip reports, and equipment safety checks. 
Both are licensed by Allied and must meet physical and other requirements 
established by Allied and the ICC. Transportation rates are set by Allied 
subject to ICC approval and the drivers are paid on a per-shipment basis. 
Allied sends the money to Hammond who pays over to the drivers their 
share and retains an amount as rental for the use of his vans. 
Id at 94 Idaho 67 
The only fair interpretation of this text is that neither driver had a DOT authority himself. 
Both drivers used the DOT authority of Allied, which paid them, passing funds through 
Hammond. If a per se Giltner-rule had existed under the then and now-same statutory criteria, 
neither driver could have been held to be an independent contractor by either the Industrial 
Accident Board and the Idaho Supreme Court! Yet that is the holding made by both as to Idaho-
based interstate moving truck drivers over forty years ago under the current statutory criteria. 
As to National, it is true that it was decided under the common law test which predated 
the codification of Idaho Code Section 72-1316 in 1963. Western noted that in presenting the 
precedent. Appellant's Opening Brief p 12. 
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This case is pertinent for two reasons: 
1. The common law test is, was and should be essentially the same as the current code in 
purpose and practice. The Legislature did not report intending anything different. (See 1963 
Idaho Session Laws, Chapter 318, pg 875 wherein the Title of the Act does not specify any intent 
to expand or modify the traditional common law definitions in use of the time. Instead, the text 
of the act simply strikes a reference to the usual common law rules and replaces it with the 
modem "independently established trade, business or profession" language still in use.) 
2. The National Trailer operation based also in Boise is identical in business model to 
that of Western' s for the delivery of oversized manufactured homes across state lines using 
independent-driver, private party trucks under written contract. 
The 1961 Idaho Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to develop a pro se rule then. It 
did not find covered employment under identical facts. That Court also was quite adamant that 
any requirements and standards imposed for compliance with governmental regulations "ARE 
NOT INDICIA OF AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP." National, supra, 83 Idaho 
at 252 (emphasis added) Thus, that earlier Court created the rule which this Court later cited with 
favor, in the paragraph of the Giltner opinion immediately preceding its inconsistent per se rule 
announcement. 
Contrary to the Department's suggestion, this case is relevant, if not controlling, as a 
longstanding view that the Western business model works lawfully. It is also contrary to any 
finding that Giltner can continue to exist as a useful rule oflaw. 
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V. 
THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM OF OTHER STATE PRECEDENT IS WEAK: NO STATE 
EXCEPT IDAHO REPORTS A GILTNER-TYPE RULE 
At page 23 of the Appellant's Opening Brief, Western discusses and distinguishes from 
the instant facts the only case cited by the Industrial Commission in its Decision and Order for 
the proposition that other states have adopted a Giltner- type rule: Merick Trucking Inc, v. 
Missouri Dept of Labor Relations, 933 S.W. 2d 938 (1996) R-31. We noted and criticized that a 
single sentence of that regional, intermediate appellate court's opinion made a passing reference 
to the centralized utilization of an ICC license. Id at 942. 
While the Department attempted to breathe life back into this connection at pages 11-12 
of its Reply Brief, it must discount both the gross factual disparities and confront the reality that 
no-other Missouri court in the seventeen years since the Merick opinion was issued has cited it as 
authority for a Giltner-type conclusion. 
Likewise the Department has stretched holdings and ignored facts in Oregon, 
Washington, New York, and especially Missouri. 
It cites Bryne Trucking Inc. v. Employment Division, 32 Or. App 229, 574 P 2d 664, 
affid. 284 or 443, 587 P 2d 473 (1978) for the proposition that Oregon would hold Western 
accountable "under facts similar to those in this case." Reply Brief p. 11 
Not only did the Oregon Supreme Court find that a "subterfuge" was used to make it 
appear that the drivers owned the company's trucks and observe that 'difficult questions" would 
have been posed had the operators actually been owners, but neither the Court of Appeals nor the 
Supreme Court, upon review, make any comment about or attach any significance to the fact that 
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all drivers used Bryne' s common carrier authority in both interstate and intrastate commerce! Id 
at 574 P2d 665 and 587 P2d 472. There is no per se employment rule in Oregon! 
The Department also cites Western Parts Transportation, Inc v. Employment Security 
Department, 10 Wash App 440 41P3d510 (2002) as a collection of similar facts upon which 
employment was found. Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals did indeed find that 
a truck driver could be found to be an "independent contractor" for federal tax law purposes, yet 
also an "employee" for unemployment coverage. The drivers operated under the trucking firm's 
state and U.S. Department of Transportation authorities. A dispute arose over an intrastate haul, 
the contract was terminated and the drivers applied for unemployment benefits. None of these 
facts are common to our case. Most significantly, an administrative hearing was had, and a 
determination was made upon the applicable statutory and administrative criteria and the Court 
sustained the ruling as supported by substantial evidence. Neither party asserted and neither 
regulators nor judges found that the single use of DOT authority to be determinative or even 
worthy of comment. There is no per se employment rule in Washington State! 
The third case offered by the Department as factually similar was Claim of Short, 233 
A.D. 2d 676, 649 N.Y.S. 2d 955 (1996). In a one page decision, a regional intermediate 
appellate court sustained an administrative board's finding of covered employment made upon 
substantial evidence. No reference in these facts is made to DOT authority and the driving seems 
to have been intrastate only. The significant point: There is no per-se employment rule in New 
York! 
Finally, the Department suggests that the Court "See also" K&D Auto Body, Inc. v. 
Division of Employment Security, 171 S.W. 3d 100 (2005). Reply Brief, p 11. This is a 
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potentially significant case because it arises out of the same jurisdiction as Meri ck Trucking, 
supra, the only case cited by the Commission as possible support for a per se rule. Decided 
nineteen years after Merick, the K&D opinion should show the current state of Missouri law and 
especially indicate whether Giltner has recent support in the Midwest. In fact, both cases were 
decided by the Missouri Court of Appeals W estem District. 
K&D was a tow truck company operating both within and without Missouri and licensed 
"throughout the United States", presumably and necessarily by a DOT authority number. Id at 
103. Compliance by both the company and drivers with Federal DOT rules is discussed in the 
text. Id at 104. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission heard conflicting evidence of 
both independence and control, applied various statutory tests, considered relevant case law, 
pondered a twenty point IRS list of factors and made a decision based upon the record. The 
Court, at great length, reviewed all twenty federal revenue ruling criteria and added two more 
from United States Supreme Court holdings. Ultimately, weighing and balancing, analyzing and 
reasoning, the Western District bench affirmed the Commission. This process as undertaken and 
the result reached by the Missouri Court of Appeals is telling and compelling. 
In Missouri, as should be the case in Idaho, there is no per se employment rule. Instead, 
review and balancing of facts is done. Thus, the attempts of the Department to cite four 
jurisdictions to butness Giltner is weak at best. The Commission's reliance on Missouri and 
Merick is likewise misplaced. 
The better-reasoned, commonly-used approach would seem to be to determine covered 
employment based on the presentation of evidence as measured against statutory criteria, even if 
a single DOT authority is used. This is done in North Carolina, New York, Wisconsin, Oregon, 
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Washington and even Missouri. It should be done in Idaho. No jurisdiction, except Idaho uses 
DOT authority as the only criteria, as far as briefing by both the Appellant and the Respondent 
have found. 
VI. 
DOT AUTHORITY IS SIMPLY ANOTHER INCIDENCE OF "GOVERNMENTAL 
REGULA TORY COMPLIANCE" AND SHOULD NOT "PER SE" DETERMINE COVERED 
EMPLOYMENT 
So what is different about DOT Authority? This Court does not allow the Department of 
Employment to butness a finding of "covered employment" by using contractual or operational 
features ofrelationship which are mandated by statute or regulation. As noted above, this has 
been the rule since 1961, when the opinion in Nation Trailer Convoy v. Employment Security 
Agency of Idaho, supra, was issued. 
Obviously, Justice Burdick writing for the majority in Giltner, supra, placed the interstate 
haul license in an entirely different category than other such regulatory requirements. But the 
opinion does not explain why. It is true that the DOT license is the lynch pin which binds all of 
the truck operations together. Holding that permit, Western can contract for loads, obtain trip 
permissions, call the drivers, assign the loads, collect the taxes and file regulatory paperwork. It 
becomes the DOT' s remote agent to assure safety checks and insurance coverage by the drivers 
for their trucks. Without it, the operation as structured cannot continue, we concede. Yet, that 
does not control the truckers. The DOT authority, after all is merely one more imposed 
regulatory compliance. If Western's license was cancelled tomorrow, each driver could seek his 
own interstate permit. Western could restructure. The drivers would still drive. 
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If the Giltner rule is to stand and be understood, this Court must explain how there can be 
two different categories of governmental regulations - some which can be used to find employer 
control and some, as it has consistently held, which may not. The Appellant respectfully 
suggests that the rule long ago announced in National, supra, that covered employment can not 
be predicated upon governmental control factors is worth preserving. No other state has 
apparently created two such categories of regulation with a resultant per se process. Instead, as 
do Washington, Oregon, Missouri and others, we should look toward contracts, facts and actual 
practices in determining whether any occupation, job or profession is or can be conducted 
independently! For independence to be presumed away in all trucker circumstances is unfair and 
makes the DOT authority into something that it is not. 
VIL 
SIGNIFICANTLY, THE DEPARTMENT MAKES NO ARGUMENT THAT PUBLIC 
INTEREST WILL BE HARMED IF GILTNER IS REJECTED 
Two public policies are involved in the resolution of this case. As to "covered 
employment," protecting against the possibility that a terminated worker, unable to promptly find 
new work, the Appellant appreciates that the Court liberally construes the Idaho Employment 
Security Law to effectuate the purposes of stability for workers. However, these drivers, who 
own their own trucks, regard themselves as proudly self employed and possess all necessary open 
road tools, insurances, licenses and in some cases even already possess an individual a DOT 
authority to haul interstate. For them, the threat of unemployability is largely illusory. They deal 
with it as does any self-employed person in a sole proprietorship. If displaced, they can 
immediately contact shippers directly or associate with another truck broker who arranges hauls. 
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The independent trucker is never without means to make an independent living. Per this record, 
no Western Home contractor has ever made an unemployment claim, nor would the Appellant 
ever expect one to do so. The Department does not argue the existence of any threat to the 
integrity of the unemployment statute requiring sweeping applications here or plead for destitute, 
abandoned working-men in this case. In fact if Giltner is again upheld, Western may well be 
compelled to terminate these contracts. Other similarly situated shippers and drivers will be 
affected as well. The Department, in this instance, is actually working contrary to labor's best 
interest. 
The second public policy at play herein is framed by the United States Department of 
Transportation rules and National Traffic Safety statutes designed to protect the driving public on 
interstate roads by assuring that long-haul truckers are inspected, insured, responsible and rested 
as they transit. Here again, the Department makes no argument that a group using Westem's 
single DOT authority raises public threats or policy problems. Nor can it make such an 
argument! It is evident from this record, that Western's interaction with drivers and centralized 
regulatory filings on behalf of the independent operators support and strengthen, not weaken, 
faithful compliance to federal law. Relieved of regulatory woes, the trucker can concentrate on 
safe driving. To the extent Giltner impairs these relations, it actually threatens public policy, 
state and federal. 
C. 
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
From the outset, as measured by Justice Jones' dissent, the Giltner precedent has been 
subject to debate and discount. On these facts, even the Industrial Commission couched the 
Page -17-
ruling from which has Western appealed by describing it "as unreasonable as it may be, 
particularly to the Employer in this case." Decision and Order, p 14, R 35 
Thus, this appeal is both factually grounded and legally appropriate, rendering the 
Department's request for fees and costs as without merit. 
D. 
CONCLUSION 
If "compliance with governmental regulations are not indicia of an employer-employee 
relationship" as this Court ruled, it should now either conform the Giltner ruling to that holding or 
explain it how it is necessary for the benefit of both the Department and its constituents to keep it. 
For each and all of the above stated reasons and precedents, this Court should overrule the precedent 
in Giltner, holding instead that DOT authority is merely another badge of compliance with 
governrnent regulation, not per se evidence of covered employment. 
DATED This __ day ofJuly, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
David H. Leroy, Attorney for the Appellant 
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